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Abstract—Responding to an emergency situation is a chal-
lenging and time critical procedure. The primary goal is to save
lives and this is directly related to the speed and efficiency at
which help is provided to the victims. Rescue robots are able
to benefit an emergency response procedure by searching for
survivors, providing access to inaccessible areas and establish-
ing an on-site communication network. This paper investigates
how a cyber attack on a rescue robot can adversely affect
its operation and impair an emergency response operation.
The focus is on identifying physical indicators of an ongoing
cyber attack, which can help to design more efficient detection
and defense mechanisms. A number of experiments have been
conducted on an Arduino based robot, under different cyber
attack scenarios. The results show that the cyber attack’s effects
have physical features that can be used in order to improve
the robot’s robustness against this type of threat.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During an emergency response operation, numerous par-
ticipants have to work simultaneously in order for the
overall outcome to be successful. However, a disaster is
very often associated with adverse conditions which make
it impossible for first responders to perform their duty.
Imagine, for example, a building collapsing as a result of
an earthquake or of a terrorist attack. Emergency personnel
searching the debris for survivors do not have access to all
disaster locations, due to the following factors: the physical
size of voids can be significantly smaller than the size of
an adult, hazard (such as fire) can be present in specific
areas and potential rescue passages can be too dangerous due
to structurally unstable debris. Robotic vehicles can serve
as extensions of emergency personnel by enabling them to
access the aforementioned locations.
However, the operation of cyber-physical systems such
as robotic vehicles often depends heavily on computer
networks. A cyber attack against or through an associated
network may impact the physical operation of the vehicle
and impair the outcome of the rescue operation. This paper
investigates the impact of a denial of service attack on an
experimental robotic vehicle. Initial observations indicated
that the robot’s movement would quickly become erratic
for a sufficiently high attack rate. The goal is to identify
physical features for detecting a denial of service attack
against the robot, instead of only using cyber features such
as communication rate.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
begins with an overview of existing approaches that tackle
the problem of cyber attacks on vehicles. A description of
the robotic testbed is given in Section III, while Section
IV presents the experimental results and elaborates on their
significance. Finally, Section VI contains conclusions and
directions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
A comprehensive review of cyber threats related to com-
munication, sensing, information management and vehicular
technologies used in emergency management is given in [1],
while a taxonomy providing a global view of the respective
attack types and defense mechanisms is presented in [2].
Cyber-physical systems have been the subject of numerous
emergency response applications. The authors in [3] present
a smart navigation system for disaster management while
a distributed emergency management simulator which can
operate in conjunction with a Wireless Sensor Network for
real-time hazard monitoring is presented in [4]. An extended
survey of cyber-physical systems geared towards emergency
management is presented in [5], where the authors elaborate
on current research related to sensor-assisted evacuation and
asynchronous control of large scale emergency response
systems. Moreover, the effects of malicious attacks to emer-
gency management systems are investigated in [6]. Finally,
the use of autonomous robots for the establishment of a
communication network between trapped civilians and an
operation centre is presented in [7] and [8].
Recent research [9] has demonstrated that cyber-physical
attacks can target production automobiles, since these ve-
hicles incorporate various sensing and computing modules
that can interact with each other in multiple ways. Initial
attacks infected the vehicle’s electronic systems through the
use of an audio file in the MP3 player device or through
smartphone connected via bluetooth. One of the possible
results of this attack is a change in the driving direction
while the vehicle is in motion.
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Apart from automobiles, another popular type of attack is
related to unmanned vehicles such as military UAVs. Off-
the-shelf software was used by Iraqi militants in order to
intercept UAV video feeds. The original use of the software
was satellite TV interception, however it could successfully
apply to unencrypted military feeds as well [10]. This
incident resulted in military aircrafts being retrofitted with
video encryption modules. US military UAVs have also been
the target of cyber-physical attacks. In 2011 numerous UAVs
have been infected by viruses which resulted in the installa-
tion of key-logging software. The most probable motive for
this attack was the creation of a mapping between the signals
emitted by the pilot’s keystrokes and the corresponding
vehicle parts that were operated. Moreover, Iranian television
broadcasted images of a US UAV and claimed that it was
hijacked and landed intact using electronic warfare. Since
military vehicles have been targeted and compromised by
cyber attacks, it is evident that civilian UAVs used by
the police or by emergency services can also be hijacked
and potentially flown into a crowd. Researchers from the
University of Texas have demonstrated this by using a
helicopter drone [11]. Furthermore, researcher at Purdue
University have investigated the autopilot mechanism of
UAVs and have modelled numerous cyber attacks that could
exploit it [12]. The authors of [13] have conducted a security
assessment by performing cyber attacks on a robot running
the Robot Operating System and found that it is vulnerable
to insider threats and to being physically compromised.
Finally, an enhanced telesurgery protocol is presented in [14]
which aims at addressing the stringent requirements related
to telesurgical robotics.
Research dealing with cyber-physical attack detection has
mainly focused on integrity attacks against industrial control
systems. Attackers modify the payload of a network packet
and manipulate a cyber-physical system into performing the
wrong physical action [15]. Replay attacks are another type
of cyber-attack which is difficult to detect using generalist
approaches. They target systems which are expected to be
in steady time for a long period of time. The authors in
[16] present a detection method for replay attacks, however
it targets only a specific type of controllers (infinite horizon
linear quadratic Gaussian controllers) and cannot be easily
applied more broadly. Another approach for cyber-attack de-
tection involves measuring anomalies between physical and
cyber properties of a cyber-physical system. These methods
are inherent to the nature of a cyber-physical system but
must overcome numerous challenges, such as timing. The
work presented in [17], [18] detects integrity and availability
attacks against a storage tank control system by using the
water level measurements reported by the SCADA module.
The approach is based on the fact that water level can only
change at rates related to pipe diameters and tank capacity.
A similar approach based on semantic errors is presented
[19] and uses temperature reading outside a specific range
to detect an intrusion. The authors state that by integrating
the intrusion detection module in the middleware layer of
an embedded system, they can achieve better results due to
simultaneous access to application logic and communication
streams among distributed components.
The aforementioned approaches focus on cyber attacks
against pedestrian and aerial vehicles, including potential
detection and defense mechanisms. They do not address,
however, this problem in the context of robotic vehicles used
for emergency management. The aim of this works is to
investigate cyber attacks targeted at robotic vehicles used
during a disaster, in order to provide efficient and accurate
detection mechanisms based on physical indicators.
III. THE ROBOTIC TESTBED
Experiments where conducted using the robot illustrated
in Figure 1. This is a 4WD robot controlled via an on-board
Intel Atom computer running the Linux operating system.
An Arduino micro-controller is responsible for driving the
robot’s motors. The robot i also equipped with a webcam
mounted on a pan and tilt system. This provides a live feed
of the robot’s location which enables remote navigation and
enhances situational awareness. The control of the robot is
achieved via Wi-Fi, by relaying commands received over
a TCP socket to the robot’s control board. Finally, the
rear wheel motors are fitted with magnetic encoders which
provide information on the angular position of each wheel.
The overall robotic system’s architecture is depicted in
Figure 2.
Figure 1. The robot used in our experiments
In order to focus the investigation solely on the physical
effects of the cyber-attack and to eliminate any side factors
which could potentially interfere with this goal, numerous
modifications were made to the testbed.
Friction: While the robot moves on the floor, the
variable friction between the floor surface and the wheels
can interfere with speed and steering control. To avoid
this, the robot was positioned on a stand, effectively lifting
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Figure 2. The robotic system’s architecture
it from the floor and providing consistent friction to all
four wheels. This setup also enabled overcoming the space
limitations of the research lab and to conduct experiments
involving long movement paths.
Network Interface: While launching a cyber-attack
against the rescue robot, it is possible that parameters
affecting the wireless communication between the controller
and the robot (such as signal strength) interfere with the
functionality of the robot. Since the focus was on the
physical effects of the attack, a wired Ethernet connection
was used for communication.
Power Supply: Under normal operation conditions the
robot is powered by a 24V battery pack. After running
lengthy experiments it was observed that the battery
depletion rate was significantly affecting the motors’ power,
which had a direct impact on measurements regarding the
robot’s speed. To remove this factor from affecting our
results, the battery pack was replaced with a desktop DC
power supply. This also removed the battery life limitation
and conduct lengthy experiments.
IV. DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK AGAINST A ROBOTIC
VEHICLE
To identify possible physical indicators resulting from a
cyber attack, a Denial of Service (DoS) attack is launched
against the rescue robot and the effects related to the
movement of the robot are measured. This Section gives the
details of the approach used along with the experimental
results.
A. Robot Movement Monitoring
As mentioned in Section III, the rear robot wheels are
equipped with magnetic encoders. Each of these devices,
reports a value for the angular position of the wheel at any
given time. The encoders communicate their measurements
to the Arduino micro-controller, which in turn sends the
relevant data to the Intel Atom on-board computer. The
encoder values were used to calculate the angular speed
of the wheels, which is directly related to the robot’s
linear speed for a given value of the wheels’ radius. A
value of 30ms was chosen as the sampling period for the
encoders, which is the highest monitoring rate supported by
the encoders.
As a comment related to the experimental equipment,
we should note that the values reported by the magnetic
encoders suffer from oscillations. After multiple experiment
runs, we determined that this is due to limitations of the
respective hardware. The side-effects of this are visible in
the angular speed figures of Sections IV-C and IV-D. In
these Sections we chose to show the raw experimental data,
without applying any kind of smoothing (e.g. a moving
average).
B. DoS Attack Characteristics
We used a multi-threaded Denial of Service attack script
to flood the robot’s network interface with TCP traffic. As
mentioned in Section III, we used a wired connection to
communicate with the robot. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the
incoming and outgoing traffic rate at the robot’s network
interface under normal operation and under an ongoing DoS
attack.
Table I
AVERAGE NETWORK TRAFFIC AT ROBOT INTERFACE(BYTES/S)
Attack-off Attack-on
Outgoing 822.9 595860.8
Incoming 585.5 7858101.2
Figure 3. Robot network interface traffic under normal operation
C. Scenario 1: Constant Robot Speed
Our first scenario involves the robot moving at a constant
speed. The robot’s speed is set by a remote software ap-
plication and its value can range from 0 to 127. For this
scenario we chose a speed value of 94, which results in an
angular speed depicted in Figure 5 where the robot operates
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of sampling the wheel encoders with a period of 30ms, as
mentioned in Section IV-A.
Figure 5. Angular speed vs. time under normal operation
The next stage of this scenario involves the robot moving
with the same selected speed, but while sustaining a DoS
attack as described in Section IV-B. The result of this setting
is depicted in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Angular speed vs. time under DoS attack
D. Scenario 2: Variable Robot Speed
Our second scenario involves the robot changing between
two speed levels (slow - high). Our aim is to evaluate the
effect of the DoS attack on the responsiveness of the robot
with respect to navigation commands. The slow speed setting
we chose is 81 and the high speed setting is 94. The timing
of the speed changes, illustrated in Table II, is achieved by an
automated script running on the remote controller computer
and communicated to the robot over a wired network.
Figures 7 and 8 depict the angular speed of the robot’s
wheels versus time, without and with DoS attack respec-
tively.
Table II
VARIABLE SPEED TIMING
Speed Speed Value Duration(ms) Start End
Low 81 6000 0 6000
High 94 6000 6000 12000
Low 81 6000 12000 18000
Figure 7. Angular speed under normal operation
Figure 8. Angular speed under DoS attack
E. Physical Indicators
Our results clearly indicate that launching a cyber attack
against a rescue robot is accompanied by physical effects
which impair the vehicle’s movement. More specifically, we
have identified two significant physical indicators related to
a cyber attack.
Robot Halting: The first physical indicator we identi-
fied by inspecting the experimental results, is the robot’s
movement pattern. Figures 6 and 8 clearly show that when
the robot is under a DoS attack, its movement becomes
erratic. More specifically, in Figure 6 we can observe that
the robot halted four times. Moreover, each of the halts has
a different duration. A similar behaviour is shown in Figure
8, where the robot’s speed varies throughout the course of
the experiment. We can observe that in this case the robot
halted six times.
Delay in Responding to Navigation Commands: A
second significant physical feature that emerges from the
robot’s behaviour when it is under a DoS attack, is depicted
in Figure 8. We can clearly see there is a delay of 2.5s
in transitioning from the low to the high speed setting.
Moreover, the overall duration of the robot’s movement is
prolonged by 7s.
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V. A HYBRID CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACK DETECTION
SCHEME
Our aim is to combine our derived physical indicators
with traditional network intrusion detection schemes to pro-
vide a more efficient detection and defense mechanism. As
we demonstrated in our experiments, attacking the robotic
vehicle resulted in both network and physical effects. In this
section we present initial experimental results of a hybrid
approach, which uses our physical indicators combined with
an Intrusion Detection System.
The physical indicator used was robot halting, as dis-
cussed in Section IV-E. We decided to use Snort [20] as our
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) since it is the most widely
adopted IDS technology. We installed Snort on the robotic
vehicle’s computer and configured it to detect an ongoing
cyber-attack. Snort uses rules in order to raise an alert for
an ongoing cyber-attack. More specifically, the user must
define a threshold which specifies the minimum number of
DoS packets received before Snort creates a new alert.
Our experiment consisted of two phases. In the first phase
(from 0 to 10 seconds) we attacked the robot with a low rate
DoS traffic. As we can see in Figure 9, there is physical
indication of an attack while Snort does not raise an alert.
In the second phase (from 10 to 25 seconds) we increase
the rate of DoS traffic. This triggered an alert from Snort
as well as stronger physical indications (i.e. longer robot
halting periods).
Figure 9. Attack detection using IDS combined with physical indicators
Our experimental results demonstrate the significance of
using physical indicators for cyber-physical attack detection.
Our physical detection element gave an early indication of
the attack, before Snort was able to detect it. After Snort
starts detecting the attack, the stronger physical indication
can be used to further confirm the detection.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented our experimental results
regarding the physical effects of a cyber attack on a rescue
robot. Our approach is based on a Denial of Service Attack
launched against the robotic vehicle. We investigated two
different robot movement scenarios and collected angular
speed measurements coming from the magnetic encoders at
the vehicle’s wheels. Our experiments indicate that the cyber
attack results in physical effects which significantly disrupts
the movement of the robot.
The significance of these observations lies in the fact that
they can be used inside a hybrid attack detection system
operating in real-time on the rescue robot. Our initial results
demonstrate that using physical indicators can enhance the
detection of an attack. In future work we will investigate the
integration of our physical indicators with an attack detection
and prevention mechanism. A potential next step would be
the development of a self-aware system [21] that would use
the physical identifiers to generate early warnings of a cyber
attack and effectively defend against it. Moreover, we will
conduct further experiments under different scenarios that
look at other physical aspects of the robot such as its power
consumption.
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